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Abstract 
The world is moving toward efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.  Net emission 
reduction efforts may involve the agricultural sector through options such as planting of trees, 
crop and livestock management changes, and production of biofuels.  However, such options can 
be competitive with domestic food production.  In a free trade arena, reduced domestic food 
production could stimulate increased production and exports in other countries, which are not 
pursuing similar mitigative courses of action.  As a consequence, net emission reductions in 
implementing countries may be offset by activities stimulated in other countries.  In addition 
producers in countries where agriculture may be influenced through higher fuel or other emission 
related prices and opportunities have expressed concern relative to their competitive position vis 
a vis countries which are not trying to reduce net emissions. 
We examine the competitive effects of differential mitigation efforts on agricultural food 
production and on international trade.  In doing this we employ the assumption that the average 
U.S. compliance caused cost increase would also occur in other complying countries. We 
consider implementation: 1) unilaterally by the U.S., 2) by all Kyoto Protocol Annex I countries 
and 3) globally.  The results, which are only suggestive of the types of effects that would be 
observed due to the simplifying cost assumptions, indicate compliance causes supply cutbacks in 
regulated countries and increases in non-regulated countries. In addition, the study results show 
that U.S. agricultural producers are more likely to benefit from a Kyoto Protocol like 
environment but that consumers are likely to be hurt in terms of their agricultural welfare. 
Key words: leakage, international trade, agricultural and forest sector, greenhouse gas, 
mitigation implementation.  
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Leakage and Comparative Advantage Implications of Agricultural 
Participation in Greenhouse Gas Emission Mitigation  
 
Society has increasingly become concerned with the potential climate implications of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and GHG atmospheric concentration.  The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, projects that GHG concentrations will cause global average 
temperature to increase by 1.4 to 5.8°C between 1990 and 2100 (IPPC, 2001).  In turn such 
warming is predicted to alter agricultural production, raise sea level, change habitat boundaries 
for many plants and animals, and induce a number of other changes (IPCC, 2001b, USGCRP, 
National Assessment Team, 2000).   Numerous strategies have been proposed to mitigate GHG 
emissions, a number of which involve agriculture and forestry (McCarl and Schneider, 2000, 
2001).   In particular, agriculture and forestry may be important players due to their emissions 
levels where as summarized in the IPCC, 2001a report agriculture is one of the primary emitters 
on nitrous oxide and methane with over 50% of the nitrous oxide, about 40% of the methane , a 
smaller set of carbon emissions due to farming activities, and the two sectors, particularly 
forestry are involved with larger emissions due to land use change and the sectors contain 
potential large sequestration and biofuel offset potential.  
GHG concentrations and their climate effects are global, thus all countries will share the 
benefits from GHG emission (GHGE) mitigation, but in the absence of widespread trading and 
emission caps only countries adopting mitigation measures will directly bear the costs.  This 
implies two things. 
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? Producers in emitting industries, and users of emission intensive products 
within countries mitigating GHG emissions are likely to experience increased 
production costs since mitigation actions are likely to make fuel, fertilizer and other 
petrochemicals prices rise along with raising the possibility of emissions related 
payments for land use change, fertilizer related nitrous oxide emissions, livestock 
related methane/nitrous oxide emissions and rice related methane emissions.   
? Competing producers in non-adopting countries may gain advantage and trade market 
share stimulating both  
o shifts in comparative advantage and  
o expanded GHG emissions reflecting emission leakage into other countries..  
This paper reports on a first order examination of the producer welfare, comparative 
advantage and leakage impacts of differential GHG emission (GHGE) mitigation efforts.  
Specifically, we examine international production and U.S. agricultural sector implications 
under: 1) unilateral U.S. GHGE mitigation implementation, 2) developed country 
implementation (in those countries falling within the Annex Ia list under the Kyoto Protocol and 
3) global implementation.   
 
a The Annex I countries are those listed in Annex I of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. 
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1. Background 
The welfare and leakage effects of agricultural GHG mitigation have been the subject of 
a number of studies.  Let us review these categorized by the major issues in the bullets above. 
1.1 Production cost and producer welfare  
The implications of pursuing agriculturally based GHG mitigation for domestic 
production cost and farm income has been a concern of producer groups.  For example, in 1998 
the U.S. Farm Bureau advanced a position that it will not support ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol (KP) unless principal international market competitor countries were also covered by 
the KP terms (Francl, 1997, Francl, Nadler and Bast, 1998).  Francl and associates asserted that 
substantial farm income (up to 84%) would be lost due to increases in fuel prices.  However, 
later analyses that considered factor substitution, product price adjustments and consumer 
demand reactions (McCarl et al 1997, USDA, 1999, Antle at al ,1999, Konyar and Howitt ,2000 , 
Peters et al, 2001) found producer welfare reductions but of much smaller magnitudes (generally 
below 10%).  However, none of these studies considered the effects of possible payments to 
farmers for carbon sequestration or taxes for methane and nitrous oxide emissions emissions 
from livestock, fertilization, and other sources.   
More recent work by McCarl and Schneider, 1999, 2001 examined both the effects of 
higher input prices and the effects of possible payments for agricultural GHG offsets finding that 
producers can benefit in aggregate largely due to the combination of direct carbon payments and 
the market price increasing features associated with a substitution of carbon production for some 
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existing agricultural production.  Similarly, Antle et al 2002 argue that producer 
incomes will be enhanced by carbon payments but did not consider possible market price 
changes.   
Across all of the studies mentioned above the assumption of constant agricultural 
conditions on behalf of international trading partners was madeb.  However, GHGE mitigation 
will be wider in scope than a unilateral U.S. effort and there may be actions on behalf of other 
participants in the world agricultural commodity markets.  Thus, when there are mitigative 
actions either unilaterally or globally this may have important implications for the implementing 
and non-implementing countries and for net GHGE reductions after leakage.  This will be 
investigated in this paper. 
1.2 Shifts in Comparative Advantage 
A rich literature has emerged on shifts in comparative advantage as caused by 
environmental regulation.  The fundamental argument is that regulations in one country may 
shift production to other countries (Pethig, 1976).  The overall literature on this topic was 
reviewed by Jaffe et al who concluded “…regulation clearly imposes large direct and indirect 
costs on society …”(pg 159) but they also conclude that “there is relatively little evidence … that 
environmental regulations have had a large adverse effect on competitiveness” (page 157).  This 
suggests that adjustments in production patterns may help mitigate the effects of regulations as 
found in the carbon tax related studies reviewed just above. 
 
b This is mentioned on page 41-42 of the USDA(1999) report but is not quantitatively explored. 
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1.3 Leakage 
Leakage occurs in a GHGE context when actions to offset emissions in one country 
stimulate additional production and consequent emissions in other countries.  Several papers 
have examined the potential empirical magnitude of leakage when GHG abatement actions (e.g., 
emissions limits, carbon taxes, or tradable permits) are applicable to only a subset of the world’s 
countries mainly in an energy context (e.g., Oliveira-Martins et al., 1992; Smith, 1998; Bernstein 
et al., 1999; Barker, 1999; Babiker, 2001 ). These leakage estimates range from negligible 
(Barker, 1999) to substantial (Felder and Rutherford, 1993), but typically are in the range of 10-
20 percent of targeted country emission reductions.  
Agricultural and forestry related leakage studies have also been done.  Wu (2000) 
examined leakage relative to the US Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), which pays farmers 
to retire land from crop production. Using data from the Natural Resources Inventory, Wu found, 
average leakage of about 20% within the U.S. with farmers adding additional lands but 
international leakage was not considered.  Leakage was also found to occur with participation in 
U.S. crop commodity programs (Brooks et al., 1992; Hoag et al., 1993). Alig et al. (1997) 
examined leakage in a forestry context and find cases where the leakage rate for carbon 
sequestration projects exceeds 100%.  Sedjo and Sohngen (2000) examine international leakage 
resulting from the establishment of large-scale forest carbon plantations using a model of the 
global timber market and find leakage rates up to 40%.   
None of these investigations examined the international agricultural effects which we will 
attempt herein. 
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2. Scope of GHGE Reduction Implementation 
In this paper we will examine the leakage and comparative advantage implications of 
three different international implementation and trading cases.  
1. Case I – Unilateral implementation where a country or a group of countries decides to 
unilaterally implement GHG mitigation.  This might happen today the Kyoto Protocol 
is implemented internationally without U.S. participation or if the U.S. implements 
the President’s Clean Air Initiative and the rest of the world fails to implement the 
KP.  In these cases, one would expect the implementing countries would be expected 
to experience higher costs of domestic production yielding lower levels of their 
domestic production and exports, and higher prices.  Simultaneously, non-
implementing countries would be expected to increase domestic production and world 
market share thereby offsetting some of the GHG emission gains in implementing 
countries. 
2. Case II – Partial global implementation where a relatively large group implement 
GHG mitigation policies. This might have happened if the KP was implemented as 
envisioned by all Annex I countries but the Clean Development Mechanism(CDM) 
turned out to be an ineffective way of drawing other countries into GHG emission 
mitigating activities.  In such a case, the Annex I countries would be expected to lose 
comparative advantage on average relative to Non-Annex I countries. The net impacts 
on individual Annex I countries and magnitude of emission leakage, however, might 
be different from Case I.   
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3. Case III – Global implementation where all countries implement a mitigation 
policy. This might have happened if the world would have implemented the KP and 
involve also all Non-Annex I countries through mechanisms such as the CDM.  In 
this setting, all countries would experience higher costs of production. 
3. Modeling  
The cases mentioned above will be evaluated herein.  To do that we need a model that 
portrays global agricultural trade and simultaneously allows examination of detailed GHGE 
mitigation possibilities within implementing countries.  A model with such global scope and 
regional detail was not available or practical to construct for this investigation.  Thus, we used a 
model that satisfies some of the needed characteristics and combined it with an assumption laden 
analytical approach.   
Specifically we used the greenhouse gas version of the U.S. Agricultural Sector Model 
(ASMGHG) developed by Schneider (2000) and McCarl and Schneider (2001).  This model 
arose from the base ASM as described in McCarl et al. (2001) and Chang et al. (1992) with the 
addition of details on soil type dependent production (developed in conjunction with USDA 
NRCS) and a global trade representation via spatial equilibrium models for eight commodities as 
developed by Chen and McCarl (2000) and Chen (1999).  The combined ASMGHG model 
considers agricultural production, consumption, and trade in developed and developing countries 
simultaneously.  Overall characteristics of the model are discussed below.   
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3.1 General Structure of the U.S. Agricultural Sector Model  
Like many agricultural sector models, ASMGHG is a price-endogenous mathematical 
program following the market equilibrium and welfare optimization concept developed in 
Samuelson (1952), and Takayama and Judge (1971).  ASMGHG assumes individual producers 
and consumers cannot influence commodity or input market prices. Production and use of 
farming inputs are portrayed in 63 regions in the U.S. and for 28 foreign regions. Data on 
currently observed trade quantities, prices, transportation costs, and supply and demand 
elasticities were obtained from Fellin and Fuller (1997, 1998), USDA statistical sources (1994a, 
b, c; annual), and the USDA, SWOPSIM model (Roningen, 1991). 
3.2 Modeling Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Mitigation Strategies  
Schneider (2000) added a GHGE mitigation component to the United States part of ASM.  
This component introduces production alternatives and GHG net emission accounting to reflect 
the GHG consequences of changes in crop mix, tillage, irrigation, fertilization, afforestation, 
biofuel production and livestock management.  Livestock management options involve: 1) herd 
size, 2) liquid manure system alterations on dairy and hog farms, 3) enteric fermentation 
management involving use of growth hormones for dairy cows and 4) stocker/feedlot production 
system adoption.  A detailed technical description of all considered mitigation strategies is 
contained in Schneider (2000).  In terms of GHGE accounting ASMGHG considers:  
• Direct carbon emissions from fossil fuels (diesel, gasoline, natural gas, heating oil, and 
LP gas) used in tillage, harvesting, or irrigation water pumping. 
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• Carbon emissions or sequestration arising from altered soil organic matter 
stimulated by adopted tillage system or land use change to and from croplands, 
forestlands and grasslands. 
• Indirect carbon emissions from manufacture of fossil fuel intensive inputs (fertilizers, 
pesticides).  
• Carbon offsets from biofuel production (ethanol, power plant feedstock via production 
of switchgrass, poplar, and willow) as well as associated and methane and nitrous 
oxide emission changes from biomass combustion. 
• Nitrous oxide emissions from fertilizer usage. 
• Methane emissions from enteric fermentation, and rice cultivation. 
• Methane savings from manure management changes as well as both methane and 
nitrous oxide emission alterations from herd size alterations.   
Individual emissions were converted to carbon equivalent measures using global 
warming potential from the IPCC(2001 a)  report (23 for methane and 296 for nitrous oxide).   
Obviously this GHG component only examines detailed emission management 
possibilities in the U.S. but not in the rest of the world.  This limitation implies that global 
adjustment to GHGE mitigation incentives cannot simulated accurately outside the U.S. but 
instead is approximated using simplifying assumptions in the remainder of the analysis.  
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able 1
4. Experimental Results and Implications  
Three alternative mitigation implementation scenarios are simulated.  The first scenario 
assumes unilateral mitigation efforts in U.S. agriculture only.  The second corresponds to a KP 
like situation with simultaneous implementation in all Annex I countries.  The third involves 
worldwide implementation.  Since we do not model the whole economy we simulate agricultural 
actions in terms of an exogenous carbon equivalent (CE) price that would obviously be set in a 
general equilibrium setting generating the supply curve of agricultural offsets.  All scenarios are 
analyzed over a range of exogenously set carbon equivalent (CE) prices ranging from 0 to 500 
dollars per ton.  
4.1 Unilateral Implementation in Just the United States 
The U.S. agricultural sector effects of a unilateral U.S. emission policy implementation 
over a range of CE prices are listed in T  and 2, which show percentage changes from a 
zero CE price.  Total CE emissions decline steadily as the price rises.  At $100 per ton, net 
emissions of CE from U.S. agriculture are about zero with the realized levels of carbon 
sequestration from carbon sinks offsetting all agricultural emissions.   
The results in Tables 1 and 2 confirm that emission reductions are obtained at the 
expense of conventional crop production.  Increasing CE prices cause decreases in U.S. 
production and exports along with increases in prices for conventional agricultural commodities.  
In addition, since the U.S. is a major trading country, production in other countries is influenced 
and comparative advantage shifts partially to those countries.   Across the range of prices 
substantial leakage can be observed.  For example, at a $100 price total U.S. production falls by 
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2.5% with traded production falling by 6.5% but global production only falls by 0.40% 
and production in non U.S. Annex I and non Annex I countries expands by 2.66% and 12.22% 
respectively.  
Welfare impacts for unilateral implementation of GHGE mitigation efforts in the U.S. are 
listed in Table 2.  U.S. consumers' surplus decreases monotonically with CE-price increases. 
Producers’ surplus on the other hand is only reduced for CE-prices below $55 per ton but 
increases above that level.  The change in producers’ surplus arises from both the traditional 
commodities markets and the CE-price induced GHG payments/charges.  These 
payments/charges include: 1) charges at the CE-price for emissions from land use change, fuel 
use, livestock, rice, fertilization and other emissions; 2) higher costs for fertilizer and other 
inputs due to the embodied emissions in their manufacture; 3) sequestration payments for 
increased soil, grassland and forest carbon storage; and 4) payments for the production of 
biofuels.  In the U.S. only implementation case, producer gains from higher commodity prices 
more than offset losses from lower levels of domestic production.  GHG accounting results in a 
net cost if emissions charges outweigh sequestration and biofuel payments.  For prices below 
$100 per ton, net emissions are positive resulting in additional sectoral cost.  Above this price, 
the amount of carbon sequestration and biofuel related carbon offsets exceed emissions and thus 
provide additional sectoral revenue.  The results also differ from the pure carbon tax studies 
showing larger total welfare impacts than the most comparable USDA(1999) and McCarl et 
al(1977) studies as the emissions effects on non CO2 gasses cause larger cutbacks and bigger 
welfare effects.  They also show consideration of international adjustment is also relevant. 
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Trade surplus measures the welfare of consumers and producers in non-U.S. 
countries attributable to trade of agricultural commodities.  If the U.S. alone implements 
agricultural provisions for mitigation, the impact on welfare in other countries is negative with 
the magnitude getting bigger as the CE-price increases.   
The results are also suggestive of what would happen under a rest of the world 
implementation of Kyoto without U.S. participation.  Namely one would expect the mirror image 
of the findings here with market share flowing to the U.S. and a leakage effect.  On the other 
hand recent analyses by integrated assessment groups (i.e. Babicker et al ,2002) show that under 
such circumstances it is likely that carbon prices will be very low in the $3 to $10 range and 
perhaps Kyoto combined with the U.S. 18% greenhouse gas intensity reduction climate change 
strategy.   
4.2 Representing Mitigation Induced Shifts in ROW Countries  
Mitigation efforts in regions outside of the U.S. could not be modeled explicitly because we did 
not have detailed data of production technologies in foreign regions, rather having excess supply 
curves.  Thus, a simplifying assumption was made to depict the supply shifts in foreign 
countries.  Namely, the average price increase and production decrease observed for each traded 
commodity in U.S. agriculture was assumed to proportionally apply to agricultural production in 
other countries.  Thus, if for a given CE price average U.S. prices for rice went up by x percent 
and production down by y percent, the same shift was applied to rice supply in foreign regions in 
all implementing countries.  We used this crude approximation because alternative reasonable 
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assumptions were not availablec.  Empirical results derived from supply shifts in non-
U.S. countries should therefore be considered illustrative but not definitive.  In presenting our 
empirical results we will focus on a comparison between the various implementation scenarios 
examined. 
4.3 Full Annex I Implementation 
The results for full Annex I country implementation are shown in Table 1.  U.S. 
agricultural production and exports decline but not as much as in the unilateral case.  This 
diminished response reflects the fact that only the non-Annex I countries now have comparative 
advantage over U.S. agriculture.  Leakage occurs in non-Annex I countries whose production 
expands by 20 percent at a $100 CE price.  Prices of traded agricultural commodities increase 
slightly more under full Annex I implementation.  The welfare results show overall U.S. welfare 
is reduced less but consumers loose even more than under unilateral implementation.  On the 
other hand, U.S. producers always gain. 
Annex I countries' net exports are highest under U.S. unilateral implementation but 
lowest if all Annex I countries are subjected to agricultural mitigation policies. Equivalently, 
non-Annex I countries' net exports are highest under full Annex I country implementation.  All 
of these observed changes become more substantial the more the CE-price increases.  Note that 
the Annex I accounts displayed in all figures do not involve the U.S. to avoid double counting.   
 
c It is also not clear if the cost increases elsewhere would be bigger or smaller as expansions elsewhere may 
involve new land development which could be subject to substantial carbon taxes. 
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igure 1
Total emission reductions from U.S. agriculture are almost identical for all 
scenarios up to CE-prices of $55 per ton (F ).  Above $85 per ton of CE, additional 
emission reductions become smaller under full Annex I country implementation.  For example, 
at a CE-price of $100 per ton, emission reductions are about 11 percent lower than for U.S. alone 
implementation.  U.S. emissions rise because higher commodity prices lead to more intensive 
production and less adoption of sequestration and emission control activities.  This would be 
offset by emission reductions in the Annex I agriculture but we cannot quantitatively represent 
that in our model as we do not have model components depicting emissions in those countries 
and extrapolation of U.S. rates would involve even more heroic assumptions than we are now 
making. 
4.4 Global GHGE Mitigation Implementation 
Provisions in the KP permit emissions credits where GHGE emission reductions from 
projects in non-Annex I countries may be counted as part of the emission reduction obligation 
for project sponsors in Annex I countries. If such provisions were implemented, low cost 
activities in agriculture could be exploited globally.  This situation is represented by the last 
scenario, where production globally is shifted using the U.S. average price and cost shift 
assumptions as explained above.  Tables 1 and 2 list the main impacts.  We find increased U.S. 
market shares at the expense of foreign countries, particularly the non-Annex I ones. Leakage is 
contained with all regions decreasing aggregate production.  Prices rise more than in the U.S. 
unilateral or KP cases.  Note this is a property of the assumptions as we have successively shifted 
more and more of the total model supply curve.   
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U.S. producers welfare gains are highest in such a situation and consumers 
losses.  Global mitigation efforts affect the level of emissions. The more countries implement 
GHGE mitigation policies, the smaller are net emission reductions from U.S. agriculture.  For 
example, at a CE-price of $100 per ton, emissions offsets are about 21 percent lower than for 
U.S. unilateral implementation. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The prospect of greenhouse gas emission mitigation policies has stimulated a wide search 
for cost-efficient emission reduction methods.  Agriculture including forestry has been proposed 
as a relatively cheap source of net emission reductions.  However, concerns have been expressed 
about agricultural abatement policies being hosted in only a subset of all countries.  The 
comparative advantage gained in the agricultural sectors of non-host countries could distort trade 
patterns, harm domestic agricultural producers in host countries, and lead to increased emissions 
in non-host countries.  Our investigation in the context of the U.S. agricultural sector, confirm 
tradeoffs between agricultural emission reductions and traditional food and fiber production.  In 
particular, the two most carbon abating strategies, afforestation and production of biofuels, cause 
the greatest decline in traditional agricultural production.  If the positive relationship between 
agricultural production and agricultural emissions also holds in foreign countries, then our results 
imply increased greenhouse gas emissions in non-host countries.  However, the consequences of 
such emission leakage would not necessarily be incurred by non-host countries but by those 
countries, which are most vulnerable to climate change.   
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The findings of this paper have several implications for policy makers.  First, if 
national agricultural greenhouse gas mitigation policies are not synchronized with foreign 
greenhouse gas emission policies, substantial leakage may occur.  For example, if an 
international treaty like the Kyoto Protocol were implemented, emission reductions in Annex I 
countries would most likely be accompanied by emission increases in Non-Annex I (developing) 
countries.  Several alternatives exist to prevent emission increases through agriculture in non-
host countries.  For example, the Kyoto Protocol proposes Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean 
Development Mechanisms (CDM).  Through such mechanisms, host countries could establish 
incentives for agricultural producers in non-host countries to avoid emission intensive 
technologies.   
Second, U.S. farmers' would benefit from a larger number of countries hosting 
greenhouse gas emission mitigation policies.  The more countries abate greenhouse gases 
through the agricultural sector, the higher agricultural commodity prices would be.  Income 
support has been a longtime objective of American farm bills and carbon payments/taxes 
contribute to farm income support but at the expense of consumers.  The unanswered general 
equilibrium question is whether the consumer is better off if GHGE mitigation is carried out in 
agriculture as opposed to elsewhere in the economy but this is beyond the scope of this study.  If 
the U.S. and other potential host countries would financially support Clean Development 
Mechanism initiatives in non-host countries, i.e. Non-Annex I countries, a portion of that 
expenditure could pay back because higher agricultural prices eliminate the need for expensive 
farm bills.   
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Third, if implementation of an equivalent mitigation policy or CDM in all 
countries is politically infeasible, trade policies might need to be negotiated to discourage 
increases in non-participating countries and to discourage leakages.  
Fourth, credits for agricultural emission abatement could be discounted to reflect likely 
emission leakage through agricultural sectors in non-host countries.  This adjustment would 
imply higher discount factors for agricultural mitigation strategies, which divert farmland.  Such 
strategies are afforestation and biofuel production.  However, strategies, which are 
complementary to traditional food and fiber production, such as reduced tillage, would remain 
eligible for full credit.  A differential treatment of agricultural mitigation strategies would then 
increase the relative adoption of complementary strategies and thus reduce leakage.   
Fifth, consumers of agricultural products incur higher expenses due to price increases.  
The more countries participate in mitigation efforts, the higher are losses to both domestic and 
foreign consumers.  Consequently, more people may become dependant on governmental aid to 
ensure sufficient food consumption.  
There are also implications for modelers.  Our results show deviation from the results of 
previous studies, which only looked at fossil fuel based carbon emission taxes.  Consideration of 
emissions from other sources such as methane, nitrous oxide and land related carbon releases are 
also important and should be considered in future studies.  The results also show international 
adjustments and potential leakage are important modeling concerns. 
The quantitative effects presented in this study reflect several simplifying assumptions 
and uncertain data, and should therefore be considered preliminary.  While efforts will continue 
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to improve the underlying data, the basic nature of our findings is unlikely to change.  
Possible extensions to our work could also involve a general equilibrium analysis. 
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Figure 1 Carbon Equivalent Prices and Net Carbon Emissions from U.S. Agriculture 
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Table 1 Impacts of Carbon Equivalent Prices on Fisher Ideal Price and Quantity 
Indices of Production, and Traded 
Mitigation Policy in 
US Only US and Annex I Countries All Countries  
$10 $20 $100 $10 $20 $100 $10 $20 $100 
U.S.          
   Production of Traded Crops 99.60 99.09 93.47 99.87 99.64 97.09 100.52 100.59 105.11 
   All Production 99.33 99.04 97.53 99.93 99.16 97.43 99.47 99.32 98.59 
   Overall Agricultural Product Prices 100.57 101.42 110.60 100.76 101.82 113.44 101.22 102.28 121.68 
   Exports 98.84 97.44 81.77 99.93 99.50 97.65 102.19 103.28 126.92 
Production of traded commodities in 
rest of world          
   Global production  99.96 99.93 99.60 99.95 99.91 99.44 99.98 99.94 99.71 
   Annex I Countries (excluding U.S.) 100.36 100.69 102.66 99.51 98.81 92.31 99.61 99.94 99.25 
    Non-Annex I Countries 100.32 100.93 112.22 100.49 102.15 120.13 96.89 93.85 57.60 
                                                 
d Note: Trading crops production includes the production for corn, soybeans, sorghum, rice, and four kind 
of wheat defined previous; all production includes production for all primary products (crops and livestock) defined 
in the model. 
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Table 2 Impacts of Carbon Equivalent Prices on Agricultural Sector 
Welfare (Million Dollars) and U.S. Emissions (MMT)e 
Mitigation Policy in 
USA Only Annex I Countries All Countries  
$10 $20 $100 $10 $20 $100 $10 $20 $100 
U.S.  Consumers' 
Surplus 
-540 
(-0.05) 
-1,240 
(-0.10) 
-9,159 
(-0.77) 
-607 
(-0.05) 
-1,536 
(-0.13) 
-11,355 
(-0.96) 
-749 
(-0.06) 
-1,976 
(-0.17) 
-17,607 
(-1.49) 
Net U.S.  Producers' 
Surplus with GHG 
tax/pay 
-207.32 
(-0.46) 
-161.70 
(-0.36) 
7,430 
(16.35) 
-71.61 
(-0.16) 
449 
(0.99) 
13,037 
(28.69) 
264.39 
(0.58) 
1,479 
(3.26) 
27,336 
(60.15) 
Ag Producers' Surplus 
without GHG Pay 
696 
(1.53) 
1,353 
(2.98) 
7,689 
(16.92) 
835 
(1.84) 
1,976 
(4.35) 
14,380 
(31.64) 
1172 
(2.58) 
3,024 
(6.65) 
30,037 
(66.10) 
Total Welfare without 
GHG Pay 
156 
(0.01) 
113 
(0.01) 
-1,471 
(-0.12) 
228 
(0.02) 
440 
(0.04) 
3,025 
(0.25) 
424 
(0.03) 
1,048 
(0.09) 
12,430 
(1.01) 
Total GHG payments 
to agriculture -903 -1,514 -259 -907 -1,526 -1,342 -908 -1,545 -2,701 
Net Welfare -748 (-0.06) 
-1,402 
(-0.11) 
-1,730 
(-0.14) 
-678 
(-0.06) 
-1,087 
(-0.09) 
1,683 
(0.14) 
-484 
(-0.04) 
-497 
(-0.04) 
9,728 
(0.79) 
Foreign Country 
Surplus 
-210 
(-0.09) 
-395 
(-0.16) 
-3,516 
(-1.45) 
1012 
(0.42) 
2,140 
(0.89) 
17,902 
(7.40) 
2557 
(1.06) 
5,360 
(2.22) 
42,156 
(17.44) 
Global Agric. Welfare -54 (-0.003) 
-282 
(-0.02) 
-4,986 
(-0.34) 
1240 
(0.08) 
2,579 
(0.18) 
20,928 
(1.42) 
2981 
(0.2) 
6,408 
(0.44) 
54,586 
(3.71) 
U.S. Agricultural GHG 
Emissions 90.37 76.74 2.58 90.61 76.32 13.40 90.81 77.23 27.01 
 
                                                 
e The numbers in parentheses give the percentage change with respect to the zero CE-price scenarios.  
Gross welfare items exclude GHGE charges/payments. 
